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BEBR

FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 91-0179

College of Commerce and Business Administration

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign


November 1991

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Revised October, 1991

Abstract

This study examined the dispute-resolution behavior of the "intravenor," a distinct third party role in organizational dispute resolution. Unlike a mediator, whose involvement in the dispute is at the whim of the disputants, the intravenor can control the outcome of the dispute. Unlike an arbitrator, who is compelled to dictate the outcome of the dispute, the intravenor may or may not impose an outcome. The experiment reported here examined the impact of four variables on third party behavior: The third-party's role (intravenor versus mediator), the third-party's beliefs about the disputants reaching agreement (cooperative versus uncooperative disputants), the third party's self-interest in the outcome, and the third party's concern about the disputants' outcome (interest in the disputant's mutual welfare). The results suggest that intravention spawns a distinctive pattern of third party behavior: Intravenors imposed outcomes in 66% of the cases, but more when they viewed the disputants as uncooperative than cooperative. Only 44% of the imposed outcomes reflected the disputants' underlying interests, but this was greater when the intravenor had high compared to low concern for the disputants' aspirations. Intravenors were more likely than mediators to use forceful, pressure tactics, and were more confident and saw themselves as more influential. Taken together, the results provide the basis for an integrated model of third-party intervention in organizational dispute resolution.

Intravention: Third-Party Intervention with Clout

Difficult disputes are often resolved with the assistance of a third party. A growing literature focuses on how the actions of third parties influence the outcomes of the dispute and the reactions of the disputants (see Bartunek, Benton & Keys, 1975; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Notz & Starke, 1978; Pruitt, 1981; Kressel & Pruitt, 1989; Kolb, 1985). In many cases, the third party role is temporary and occurs within a preestablished set of rules and guidelines that specify when intervention will begin and end. The third party is an outsider to the dispute, meeting with the parties for a brief time and rarely if ever seeing them again. Examples of outside third parties include labor mediators and community mediators and arbitrators (Kressel & Pruitt, 1989; Rubin, 1981). In other contexts, however, there is no formally defined intervention role. The individual who intervenes emerges from a set of actors who are part of the disputants' organization or system. After the dispute is resolved, the third party continues to have a relationship with the parties (see Kressel & Pruitt, 1989, for a discussion of "contractual" and "emergent" mediation). In some cases, the individual who intervenes has (1) organizational authority to dictate the outcome of the dispute and (2) personal interests at stake in the dispute (Rubin, 1981; Walton, 1969). Murnighan (1986) has called such third parties "intravenors".

Mediation and arbitration are the two classic modes of third party intervention (Pruitt, 1981). Mediators lack decision control (Thibaut & Walker, 1975): They can suggest solutions, but they cannot impose an agreement; decision control remains with the disputants. Arbitrators, however, have decision control: They must provide a settlement which is

typically binding on both sides. Goldberg and Brett (1990) suggest that disputants prefer mediation, in part because it allows them to keep decision control.

Analogies of manager-as-mediator and manager-as-arbitrator dominate discussions of managerial third party intervention. Several scholars (e.g., Brett & Goldberg, 1983) suggest that organizations should use mediation. Others (Notz, Starke & Atwell, 1983; Sheppard, 1984; Kolb & Sheppard, 1985) argue that managerial mediation is rare. Instead, supervisors use their power and/or their position to impose solutions, much like arbitrators. Murnighan's (1986) concept of intravention provides a characterization of the potentially hybrid role played by organizational third parties. The idea of intravention also responds to Notz and Starke's (1978) call for a maximally effective third party procedure, as well as Sheppard's (1983) call for investigating innovative dispute resolution procedures. Intravenors can impose a settlement but have the freedom not to (Conlon, 1988). They may also be influenced by their own self-interest and the fact that they typically continue as active members of their organization, as do the disputants.

Decision control and managerial discretion, then, provide key distinctions among intravention, mediation, and arbitration. Surprisingly, managerial discretion has received only scattered attention in the organizational (e.g., Tannenbaum & Schmidt, 1958; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) and third party literatures (e.g., McGillicuddy, Welton & Pruitt, 1987; Conlon & Fasolo, 1990). Although the ability to exert control may appear to be an advantage for third parties, intravenors' discretion creates a great deal of uncertainty for them as well as for the disputants.

At present, no systematic study of intravenor action exists. How and when intravenors use their decision control are open questions. How and when they use specific strategies to resolve the dispute--what they do prior to exercising their decision control--are also open questions. In this study, we compared empirical observations of the behavior of intravenors to the behavior of mediators in similar situations. Murnighan's (1986) model of intravention and Carnevale's (1986a) model of mediation provide the theoretical foundations for this research.

The Concern-Likelihood Model of Mediation

Carnevale's (1986a) concern-likelihood model¹ classifies mediator behavior into four basic strategies: 1. Problem solving (attempts to foster integrative, win-win agreements); 2. Compensation (efforts to entice the parties into concessions or agreements via the promise of rewards and benefits); 3. Pressure (efforts to force the parties into concessions or agreements via the threat of punishment or penalties); and 4. Inaction (a conscious effort to let the parties handle the conflict on their own). The model postulates two antecedent variables that interact to predict mediator behavior: 1. The mediator's likelihood estimate of a win-win agreement ("perceived common ground"); and 2. The mediator's level of concern that the parties' achieve their aspirations (see Carnevale, 1986a). Perceived common ground typically arises from evidence of the disputants' cooperativeness; concern is defined as a mediator utility function that places positive value on the parties' collective welfare (see Carnevale, 1986b, for a discussion of mediator utility functions).

The model predicts that mediators will emphasize: 1. a problem-solving

strategy aimed at discovering win-win solutions when they have high concern for the parties' aspirations and perceive that the likelihood of a win-win agreement is high; 2. compensation to entice the parties into concessions and agreements when they have high concern for the parties' aspirations and perceive that the likelihood of a win-win agreement is low; 3. pressure to force the parties to reduce their aspirations and make concessions when they have little concern for the parties' aspirations and perceive that the likelihood of a win-win agreement is low; and 4. inaction, letting the parties handle the dispute on their own when they have low concern for the parties' aspirations and perceive that the likelihood of a win-win agreement is high.

Several studies using a laboratory simulation method (Carnevale & Conlon, 1988; Carnevale & Henry, 1989; Harris & Carnevale, 1990) found evidence supporting the concern-likelihood model. In these studies, subjects served as mediators, suggested possible settlements in a three-issue negotiation task, and sent messages (from a preselected list) to simulated negotiators. Although the results of these studies have been supportive of predictions, the model is by no means a comprehensive theory of third party action. Murnighan (1986) made this point, and argued that the "intravenor" third-party role, typically found in organizational dispute resolution, is associated with a very different pattern of behavior.

Intravention

Murnighan (1986) argued that in organizational disputes, third parties often have both the authority to impose agreements and self-interests that might be affected by the dispute's resolution. Thus, Murnighan postulated two antecedent variables that interact to predict intravenor behavior: 1. The

third party's power over the disputants to dictate the outcome, and 2. the third party's own interests, with the assumption that third parties will attend to their own interests before the disputants' interests.

Intravenors are predicted to impose decisions to satisfy their own self-interests. Intravenors rely on two strategies, problem solving and pressing, for dispute resolution. Problem solving is an attractive strategy that can satisfy everyone's needs; pressing is particularly attractive to intravenors because, unlike mediators, they can press the disputants harder by threatening to impose a settlement. Mediators cannot impose settlements and are thus less able to act on their self-interest.

Research at a community mediation center (McGillicuddy et al, 1987) generated results that supported the intravention model. "Mediator-arbitrators" (mediators who later became arbitrators in the same dispute) were more forceful than pure mediators, and disputants were less hostile and competitive and engaged in more problem solving when the third party could control the outcome.

Research Overview

The concern-likelihood model makes predictions for mediators who have little or no self-interest and no control over the outcome of the dispute. Murnighan (1986) argued that intravenors typically threaten to impose settlements, and will rely almost exclusively on pressure and problem solving tactics. The key difference between mediation and intravention, according to Murnighan (1986), is the third party's decision control and incentives: An intravenor will impose outcomes that primarily reflect their own self-interest, and will be less affected by the level of concern for the

parties' outcomes or the perceived cooperativeness of the parties.

The present study examined the effects of third party role, self-interest, concern, and perceived cooperativeness of the disputants (perceived common ground). The latter two independent variables derive from the concern-likelihood model, and thus allow a replication of our previous research (Carnevale & Henry, 1989; Carnevale & Conlon, 1988).² Previous tests of the concern-likelihood model focused on the messages third parties addressed to disputants as indicators of the third party's strategic choices. We adopted many aspects of this methodology here, with two important changes. In previous studies, mediators were forced to select messages from a carefully constructed and pilot-tested list (e.g., Carnevale & Conlon, 1988). In the current study, third parties could also formulate and send the disputants any message they wished. This provided an opportunity to check whether third parties' communications were constrained by this list of messages. The second change concerned the manipulation of perceived common ground. In previous studies, high perceived common ground was manipulated by having the programmed bargainers' offers converge on an integrative solution. In the present study, to make the bargaining appear more realistic, the programmed offers under high perceived common ground moved toward a compromise solution.

Method

Participants and Research Design

Undergraduate business students (N = 222) participated in return for class credit and a chance at several monetary prizes. Volunteers participated in group sizes ranging from twelve to thirty. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design varied third party role (intravention versus mediator), self-interest

(low versus high), concern for disputants (low versus high) and perceived common ground (low versus high). Cell frequencies were either 13 or 14.

Procedure

Each participant sat before a personal computer that randomly assigned the experimental condition, presented the instructions, controlled the negotiation, and presented the questionnaire. The experimenter and all assistants were blind to the subjects' assignments. Participants were told that they would interact with two other subjects in the room via the computer network. Everyone was then "randomly" assigned the role of Product Manager; their task was to assist two other managers (the New York and Boston managers) in settling a dispute. The offers of the New York and Boston managers were computer programs which disagreed on three issues: The size of transferrable accounts, length of service in the company before being eligible for promotion, and promotion criteria. The issues were displayed on the computer screen in tabular form as in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 about here

Nine different outcomes, labeled "A" through "I", were possible on each issue. Participants were told that the managers needed to agree on an outcome for each issue. Points shown next to each possible outcome represented that outcome's value for each manager. Third parties saw the managers' outcome tables one after the other --not simultaneously-- and were told that the disputants would only see their own table. Although not communicated to participants, the task included integrative tradeoffs among the three issues:

The most valuable issue for the New York manager was the least valuable issue for the Boston manager, and vice versa. Thus, by trading off these two issues, the disputants could achieve an integrative, equal-outcome solution ("AEI") with a higher joint payoff (320 points) than the simpler compromise solution ("EEE"; 240 points).

The program displayed messages and proposals from each disputant for eight rounds before interrupting the negotiations. Third parties could send messages to either or both disputants and suggested settlements to both of them each round. Prior to every round, participants saw each manager's payoff table and their own. They were told that the final agreement would determine the number of lottery tickets they would have in a pool that would determine whether they, or some other participants in their same role, would win one of five prizes (one of \$100; four of \$50 each). Instructions emphasized that their chances of winning increased as the number of their lottery tickets increased.

Independent Variables

Intravention versus mediation role. Mediators were told that they were peers of the New York and Boston managers. They were also told that they did not have the authority to impose outcomes but were free to mediate, make suggestions, facilitate an agreement, or opt out of the negotiations at any time. Intravenors were told that the two managers were their subordinates. They were told that they could impose an outcome if they wished, or they could mediate, make suggestions, or opt out of the negotiation. Thus, our operationalization of mediators and intravenors included role differences (peer vs. boss) and typically concomitant authority differences (power to

suggest vs. power to impose).

Perceived common ground. When perceived common ground was high, the managers (i.e., the computer programs) made relatively large concessions each round, implying that they would ultimately agree. The New York managers proposed "AAA", "BAB", "BBB", "CBB", "CCD", "DCD", "DDD", and "DED"; the Boston managers proposed "III", "HIH", "HHH", "HHG", "FGG", "FGF", "FFF", and "FEF". They were close to agreement after eight rounds. When perceived common ground was low, the managers made smaller concessions: New York's proposals were "AAA", "AAA", "ABA", "ABA", "ABA", "ABB", "ABB", and "BBB"; Boston's were "III", "III", "IHI", "IHI", "IHI", "HHI", "HHI", and "HHH". They were far from agreement after eight rounds.

Self-interest and concern. Third party self-interest and concern for the disputants' aspirations were manipulated independently by varying the outcomes in the subjects' own payoff tables³. With low self-interest and low concern, the agreement between the disputants did not affect their outcome (see Table 2a); reaching any agreement gave them a fixed number of lottery tickets. With high self-interest and low concern, their outcomes were in direct opposition to the integrative solution for the two managers.⁴ In other words, while "AEI" provided the highest equal joint outcome for the disputants, it provided the lowest outcome for the third party. Self-interested third parties preferred "IEA" (see Table 2b).

With low self-interest and high concern, the payoff table was perfectly consistent with the integrative solution of the disputants: "AEI" was best for everyone (see Table 2c). Finally, with both high concern and interest, the payoffs for the high interest/low concern and low interest/high concern were

combined, providing the best of the payoffs from Tables 2b and 2c for each outcome. Thus, the highest third party outcomes were for either "AEI" or "IEA" (see Table 2d).

Insert Table 2 about here

Dependent Variables and Analyses

The computer recorded the third parties' suggested settlements and messages. If not yet completed, negotiations were interrupted on the eighth round. Everyone then responded to a questionnaire concerning their perceptions of the disputants and their own goals. A complete explanation of the experiment concluded each session.

Results

Suggested settlements made by third parties were divided into five categories. Proposals that provided each disputant: (1) with exactly 120 points (i.e., the "EEE" solution) were coded as compromises; (2) with more than 120 points (such as "AEI" or "CEG") as joint benefit; (3) with less than 120 points (such as "IEA" or "GEC") as self-interested. Proposals which provided one disputant with less than 120 points and the other with more were coded as (4) favoring Boston or (5) favoring New York.

In addition to suggested settlements, third parties could choose from a list of provided messages or they could formulate and send their own (see Table 4). The provided messages were similar to those used in previous research; several "imposing" (harsh pressing) messages were also included. As in previous studies (e.g., Carnevale & Conlon, 1988), rounds where the third

party did not send a message were treated as "No action" and were combined with messages that communicated inaction.

The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the questionnaire measures are shown in Table 3. Ratings of the importance of an agreement, wanting a good outcome for the managers and for the third party, the importance of managers getting equal outcomes, and making offers the bargainers would like were all positively correlated. Also positively correlated were perceptions of the power of the two managers, the perceived influence of the third party's messages and proposals, and the managers' needs for assistance. In general, similar items were correlated and dissimilar items were not.

Insert Table 3 about here

Manipulation Checks

Analysis of the manipulation checks indicated that the manipulations were successful [F -ratios ($df = 1, 221$) exceeded 16.49, $p < .001$ in each test]. Intravenors felt more powerful than mediators ($M = 3.91$ vs. 2.30, 5 point scale), believed that their role was superior to the disputants' ($M = 2.69$ vs. 2.03, 3 point scale), and that they could impose an outcome ($M = 1.96$ vs. 1.06, 2 point scale). Third parties in low perceived common ground disputes believed that the bargainers were less cooperative ($M = 3.64$ vs. 5.66, 6 point scale), an agreement was less likely ($M = 3.03$ vs. 4.22), and more rounds would be needed before the disputants could reach an agreement ($M = 3.68$ vs. 2.61).

Since third party levels of concern and self-interest were manipulated by the payoff tables, the average value of settlements they suggested during the negotiation acted as a check of these manipulations. Third parties with low concern suggested settlements of less value to the disputants than third parties with high concern ($\bar{M} = 242.7$ points vs. 262.6 points). Proposals were also less valuable to the negotiators when third party self-interest was high ($\bar{M} = 245.9$ points vs. 259.1 points). The interest by concern interaction indicated that the average value of third party proposals decreased in the following order: (1) high concern with low self-interest ($\bar{M} = 265.4$) was significantly greater than either (2) high concern with high self-interest ($\bar{M} = 259.7$) or (3) low concern with low self-interest ($\bar{M} = 253.0$), which were significantly greater than (4) low concern and high self-interest ($\bar{M} = 232.4$), $F(1, 221) = 7.54, p < .007$.

Overview of Analyses

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) examined the main and interaction effects of the four independent variables on the dependent measures of third party messages, offer proposals, and post-negotiation perceptions⁵. Significant multivariate effects were found for the manipulations of third party role, multivariate $F(30, 177) = 5.22, p < .001$, interest, multivariate $F(30, 177) = 1.55, p < .04$, concern, multivariate $F(30, 177) = 2.81, p < .001$, and perceived common ground, multivariate $F(30, 177) = 2.23, p < .001$. An interaction was obtained between third-party role and perceived common ground, multivariate $F(30, 177) = 1.78, p < .01$. A priori t -tests and univariate follow-up tests are reported below.

Content Analysis of Messages Sent to Disputants

Overall message frequencies and the proportion of different messages used by each participant were tabulated. Self-generated messages were coded as indicative of one or a combination of the four basic strategies (pressing, problem solving, compensating, or inaction), of imposing an outcome, or "miscellaneous." The three authors and a trained assistant independently classified each message. Over 80% of the messages were unanimously classified in the same category; this consistency is similar to that achieved by other coding schemes in the literature (Pruitt, 1981). A brief discussion among the judges easily resolved the different classifications, which were typically messages reflecting multiple strategies.

Insert Table 4 about here

An initial analysis revealed significant differences in the use of provided and self-generated messages, $X^2(4) = 69.20$, $p < .001$: Whereas problem solving was the most frequently used of the provided messages ($n = 370$, versus 181 for pressing), pressing was the most frequent self-generated message ($n = 100$, versus 71 for problem solving). Self-generated messages expressing compensating ($n = 7$) and inaction ($n = 3$) were rare.

Consistent with past research (Carnevale & Henry, 1989; Carnevale & Conlon, 1988), problem solving ($n = 441$) and inaction (no message, $n = 369$, plus inaction messages, $n = 15$) messages were most prevalent, followed by pressing ($n = 281$), imposing ($n = 105$), compensating ($n = 90$), and messages reflecting both problem solving and pressing ($n = 59$). Seventeen other

messages combining various strategies were lightly spread across the conditions and were eliminated from the analysis. The remaining six categories (pressing, problem solving, compensating, inaction, imposing, and problem solving-pressing) accounted for over 98 percent of the third parties' messages (see Table 4).

Our evaluation of the impact of the experimental variables on the messages compared the proportions⁶ of problem solving, pressing, compensating, or no action third party messages in each condition. For the statistical analyses, imposing messages were incorporated in the pressing category, and half of the problem solving-pressing messages were added to the problem solving category, half to pressing. The message proportions in each condition are reported in Table 5.

Insert Table 5 about here

Tests of the Models' Predictions. The design allows a partial replication of the concern-likelihood model in the conditions where the third party was a mediator and had low self-interest (the top quarter of Table 5). The data were generally consistent with past research (Carnevale & Conlon, 1988; Carnevale & Henry, 1989): Inaction was greatest when there was low concern and high perceived common ground (prop. = .51 vs. mean prop. = .16 for the other messages), $t(14) = 2.68$, $p < .02$; problem solving was greatest when there was high concern and high perceived common ground (prop. = .46 vs. mean prop. = .18 for the other messages), $t(14) = 2.22$, $p < .05$. While pressing was common when there was low concern and low perceived common ground (prop. =

.30 vs. mean prop. = .23 for the other messages), the difference was not significant. The major deviation from past research was the sparse use of compensation messages in the high concern, low perceived common ground condition.⁷

The intravention model predicts the frequent use of pressing and problem solving by third parties. The bottom half of Table 5 shows the proportion of message use by intravenors. When self-interest was low, intravenor use of pressing and problem solving was significantly greater than inaction and compensating (minimum $t(14) = 2.93$, $p < .02$) except in the low concern, low perceived common ground condition, where pressing and problem solving were more frequent but not significantly so. When self-interest was high, pressing and problem solving were more frequent when concern was high and perceived common ground was low (mean prop. = .40 vs. mean prop. = .10 for the other messages), $t(13) = 6.26$, $p < .001$. When concern and perceived common ground were both low or both high, pressing and problem solving by intravenors was very common, but not significantly more than other messages. Only in the low concern, high perceived common ground condition did self-interested intravenors fail to press and problem solve a majority of the time, opting instead for inaction. Note that this condition is exactly when the concern-likelihood model predicts inaction.

Extending the intravention model predictions into the realm of mediators (the top half of Table 5), pressing and problem solving were again used a majority of the time (but not significantly more) in all conditions except when mediators have low self-interest, low concern, and perceive high common ground (where inaction was again the dominant choice).

Self-Interest and Concern: Effects on Messages and Recommendations

Self-interest had a greater impact on the third parties' suggested agreements than on their messages. High self-interest, compared to low self-interest, led to more self-interested suggestions (mean prop. = .10 vs. mean prop. = .05), $F(1, 206) = 5.53$, $p < .05$, and fewer joint benefit suggestions (mean prop. = .19 vs. mean prop. = .31), $F(1, 206) = 9.34$, $p < .01$.

Concern had an even greater impact. High concern led the third party to have a longer involvement in the dispute (6.69 rounds versus 5.81 rounds), $F(1, 206) = 8.56$, $p < .01$, to generate fewer self-interested suggestions (mean prop. = .03 vs. mean prop. = .12), $F(1, 206) = 16.15$, $p < .001$, and to make more joint benefit suggestions (mean prop. = .34 vs. mean prop. = .17), $F(1, 206) = 24.94$, $p < .001$. High concern also led to more problem solving messages (mean prop. = .36 vs. mean prop. = .28), $F(1, 206) = 4.94$, $p < .05$, fewer inaction messages (mean prop. = .27 vs. mean prop. = .35), $F(1, 206) = 4.22$, $p < .05$, and more self-rated concern for a good outcome on the questionnaire ($M = 5.31$ vs. 4.80), $F(1, 206) = 8.64$, $p < .01$.

Third-party role x perception interactions. The third-party role by perceived common ground interaction affected three measures (minimum $F(1, 206) = 5.03$, $p < .03$). Intravenors threatened an imposed outcome more when there was low rather than high perceived common ground (mean prop. = .15 vs. mean prop. = .09); mediators threatened an imposed outcome (an empty threat) rarely, regardless of the perceived common ground condition (mean prop. = .03 and .02). Intravenors' threats corresponded with their satisfaction with the disputants' progress in the negotiation: They were least satisfied with the disputants' progress in the low perceived common ground conditions ($M = 1.62$)

and most satisfied with the disputants' progress in the high perceived common ground disputes ($M = 2.98$). The means for the mediators on this measure were intermediate.

Roles and perceived common ground also led to an interaction for the frequency of joint benefit suggestions. Intravenors in the high perceived common ground condition, who were most satisfied with the parties' progress and made the least threats to impose an outcome, made fewer joint benefit suggestions (mean prop. = .19) than when they had perceived low common ground (mean prop. = .37). Mediators made more joint benefit recommendations when disputants were already acting cooperatively but were moving toward a compromise, i.e., when perceived common ground was high (mean prop. = .35 vs. mean prop. = .26).

Imposed Outcomes

Third parties with intravention power imposed agreements in 72 out of 110 cases (66%). Of the 72 imposed outcomes, more occurred in the low perceived common ground conditions than in the high perceived common ground conditions (44 versus 28). Of the 38 instances where the intravenor decided not to impose an outcome, 11 were under low perceived common ground, 27 when common ground was high. The concern and interest variables did not influence the distribution of imposed or nonimposed outcomes.

Quality of imposed outcomes. Classifying the imposed agreements with the same coding scheme used for suggested settlements yielded 32 (44%) joint benefit, 19 (26%) compromise, 8 (11%) self-interested, and thirteen (18%) imposed agreements that favored one disputant over the other. The former three imposition types yielded several systematic effects: Joint benefit

impositions occurred more when third party concern was high (25 of 32), and when perceived common ground was low (26 of 32). Self-interested impositions (7 of 8) and compromises (15 of 19) were most often imposed when the intravenor had low concern. The only interaction indicated that joint benefit solutions were imposed most in the high concern, low perceived common ground conditions (19 of 32), and never in the low concern, high perceived common ground conditions.

Timing of imposed outcomes. The imposed agreements occurred at about equal intervals across the eight rounds of negotiation. Of the 72 impositions, their frequency across rounds was (beginning with Round 1) 7, 11, 9, 11, 10, 5, 12, and 7. Concern was the only factor to significantly influence the timing of impositions: When intravenors had low concern for the parties' outcomes, they imposed outcomes earlier ($M = 3.86$) than when they had high concern ($M = 4.95$), $F(1,71) = 4.31$, $p < .05$.

Timing and quality of imposed outcomes. Early impositions, defined as those that occurred on Rounds 1 through 4 ($n = 38$), were compared to late impositions, defined as those that occurred on Rounds 5 through 8 ($n = 34$). Compromise and self-interested impositions occurred early (32% vs. 21% for compromise; 16% vs. 6% for self-interested); joint-benefit outcomes were imposed later (37% vs 57%). The longer the intravenor waited before imposing an outcome, the more likely the outcome reflected the underlying interests of the disputants.

Intravenor Versus Mediator Role, and Perceived Common Ground

Consistent with our expectations, the ability to impose an agreement reduced perceived common ground: Intravenors felt that an agreement was less

likely ($M = 3.33$ vs. 3.90 , 6 point scale) and that the disputants would need more rounds to reach agreement ($M = 3.32$ vs. 2.98 , 5 point scale; F -ratios ($df = 1, 221$) exceeded 16.49 , $p < .001$ in both cases). Other measures indicated important behavioral and perceptual differences between mediators and intravenors (see Table 6). Possibly as a result of reduced common ground, intravenors ended their involvement in the negotiation (either by imposing settlements or opting to leave the negotiation) more quickly than mediators, and repeated their proposals more than mediators. Intravenors sent fewer compromise suggestions, and more pressing and imposing messages than mediators.

Insert Table 6 about here

In their questionnaire responses, intravenors felt that an agreement was more important than mediators, and that both managers needed their assistance more. Intravenors expressed greater self-confidence and were more willing to be involved in future negotiations with the two managers. Intravenors' enhanced confidence was also evident in their perceptions that their proposals were more influential than the mediators', their messages were more influential, and they were more satisfied with what they could do in the negotiation. Compared to mediators, then, intravenors perceived the situation as more severe, yet they were more confident in their intervention effort.

High perceived common ground, compared to low perceived common ground, produced more self-interested suggestions and more problem solving messages, along with fewer pressing and imposing messages. From questionnaire measures,

low perceived common ground led to third party beliefs that the two managers needed more assistance, less satisfaction with the actions of the disputants, and less satisfaction with the progress they had made in negotiations. In addition, when there was low perceived common ground, the third parties in general believed that their proposals were less influential, and were less satisfied with their role in the negotiation.

Discussion

The data from this study are clear: Intravenors--third parties who can impose an outcome if they wish--displayed a distinctive pattern of dispute resolution behavior. They were more likely to use forceful, pressure tactics, were less likely to see that the disputants could reach an agreement on their own, were more self-confident, and were more likely than not to impose an outcome. Intravenors clearly matched Kolb and Sheppard's (1985) conceptualization of organizational third parties who use their power. They were not ruthless, however: They were most likely to impose outcomes that were beneficial to the disputants, especially when they were concerned about the disputants, when they believed that the disputants would not reach agreement by themselves, or when the negotiation had continued for at least five rounds. The intravention model thus represents an important addition to the literature on third parties. Prior to this research, mediation and intravention were models of third-party intervention that rested on unique assumptions about operating conditions and characteristics.

An Integrated Model of Organizational Dispute Resolution

The results of this study suggest an integrated model of third party intervention that encompasses both mediation and intravention roles. The

integrated model is derived from two patterns that were observed in the data of this study: 1. Third party inaction when it appears that the disputants can handle the conflict on their own, and 2. Considerable action (e.g., imposed outcomes) when inputs are available and/or potentially helpful. These patterns suggest a time-based model where third parties become more active as a dispute continues (cf. Kressel, 1972). In addition, forces that increase a third party's involvement (intravention power, self-interest, concern in the absence of self-interest, and low perceived common ground) should also increase action. These action/inaction concepts can be used to develop a model of third party action (see Figure 1) that accounts for much of the data in this study. In addition, as the four independent variables of this study all affected the third party's involvement, they are also incorporated in the model.

Two structural elements, the power of the third party and perceived common ground, had consistently strong effects in this study. Strategically, third parties were less active when perceived common ground was high. In addition, they proposed relatively poor agreements for the disputants when perceived common ground was high and they had intravention power. Low perceived common ground, on the other hand, led to more problem solving and pressing, sometimes in the same message. Indeed, problem solving-pressing messages were effective double-barrels: Disputants needed to move toward each other, and, in some sense, reciprocate the third party's efforts (which, being problem solving, should have been perceived as sincere).

Thus, the relationship between the third party and the disputants, and the effect of this relationship on perceptions of common ground, are important

initial elements in our integrated model. Mediators' behaviors are constrained by their relationship with the disputants and/or a lack of decision control. Their action also depends on the relative importance of self-interest and concern: Concern for the disputants should dominate self-interest for mediators. If self-interest prevails, mediators may try to take control of the process and even act like they have intravention power. Kolb (1985), for instance, cogently discusses the intangible power mediators try to establish for themselves during the process. If concern for the disputants dominates, then third parties have additional incentives to problem solve, especially when perceived common ground is low and when compensation is not possible.

When third parties are intravenors, self-interest can be overtly expressed; the third party's clout makes self-interested agreements more probable. Intravenors may temper their dominance and act like mediators, however, if they have little self-interest or if they are seriously concerned about the disputants' outcomes. This concern could, for example, result from a positive correlation between favorable outcomes for the subordinates (i.e., the disputants) and for the superior (i.e., the intravenor). This establishes an interesting comparison between self-interested mediators who will try to establish decision control, and less self-interested intravenors who may relinquish this control. How the disputants respond to such shifts in the structure of the third party's role will be an important determinant of the dispute's outcome and an obvious topic for future research.

Although forces may push for the hegemony of self-interest over concern, one set of forces is likely to predominate. In this study, the surprising

infrequency of self-interested impositions indicates that concern may have won out over self-interest. In organizational contexts, concern may also dominate self-interest when a settlement's consequences are not critical to the third party's long range goals. Disputes over the process of reaching a short term goal, for example, may be unimportant to the third party as long as the goal is attained. Should the dispute involve goals or outcomes relating to the department's or the organization's overall effectiveness or mission, however, the third party's self-interest may dominate any concern for the disputants. A study of self-interest in disputes with potentially variable consequences would be particularly illuminating.

Thus, we posit that three sets of determinants, along with the simple but compelling effects of time, drive a third party's involvement and action in a dispute (Figure 1): (1) whether the third party has mediation or intravention power; (2) whether progress toward agreement (perceived common ground) reduces the need for the third party to intervene; and (3) whether self-interest dominates the third party's concern for the disputants. The long term consequences of the dispute's potential resolution, as perceived by the third party, should directly influence the last of these sets of determinants.

Perceived consequences, then, become an additional element in the model. Mediators act in ways that will reflect well on them. Intravenors have more scope: They will be reluctant to let disputants reach an agreement that threatens their own interests, even if those interests are only indirectly related to the dispute. The consequences to the third party, then, may work in much the same way as perceived common ground: When perceived common ground is low and/or consequences are dangerous, third parties should be very active.

When perceived common ground is high and/or consequences are unimportant, less action is necessary.

Insert Figure 1 about here

This integrated model incorporates structural and interpersonal factors within the context of a differentiable dispute environment and predicts how active a third party's conflict resolution strategies are likely to be. It identifies when bosses or peers are most likely to get involved as third parties and when power and self-interest will dominate. Clearly, we would like to see its implications tested.

Many issues concerning the disputants and their reactions remain open questions. Three (of many) immediate questions include: (1) Will disputants react negatively to settlements imposed by intravenors, even when they are favorable, simply because they resent having the decision made for them (cf., Castore & Murnighan, 1978; Conlon & Fasolo, 1990)? (2) When will intravenors act like mediators (and only make suggestions) and how can they effectively implement their strategic choices? (3) Is hierarchical authority or decision control (or both) responsible for the many differences observed between mediators and intravenors? Efforts are also necessary to determine the organizational antecedents of intravenor behavior and the consequences of intravenor decisions for organizational members. We hope that the present findings have provided a basis for further theoretical and empirical developments that may eventually offer the possibility of a more comprehensive model of organizational conflict resolution.

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Author Notes

We gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions provided by Howard Garland, Dan Ilgen, Deborah Kolb, Greg Oldham, Gerald Salancik, and two anonymous OBHDP reviewers. Portions of this paper were written while the third author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the National Science Foundation (Grants BNS87-00864, SES88-15566 and BNS88-09263) and the Russell Sage Foundation. Portions of this manuscript were presented at the meeting of the International Association for Conflict Management, Athens, GA.

Footnotes

1. The concern-likelihood model was previously called the strategic choice model of mediation (e.g., Carnevale, 1986a).
2. In past studies of the concern-likelihood model, the mediator's concern for the disputants' aspirations was operationalized in a rather complex fashion (Carnevale & Henry, 1989; Carnevale & Conlon, 1988): In the high concern conditions, the mediator was told that (a) both disputants were highly regarded members of the organization, (b) the disputants would evaluate the mediator's performance, and (c) they would meet with both disputants after the negotiation. In low concern conditions, the disputants were portrayed as laggard, there was no mention of an evaluation, and no mention of meeting them afterwards. In the present study, we implemented concern for the disputants' directly by the payoffs: In the high concern conditions, the mediators' outcomes were positively correlated with the joint outcome of the disputants; in low concern, there was a zero correlation.
3. Self-interest, like the concern independent variable, was also implemented via payoffs: In the high self-interest conditions, the third parties' outcomes were negatively correlated with the joint outcome of the disputants; in low self-interest, there was a zero correlation. Thus, both third party concern and self-interest are seen as independent conditions derived from the third party's incentives.
4. It may seem curious that a third party with interests opposed to one or both disputants is involved in a dispute not as another player, but as a mediator or intravener. It should be noted that, at least in international conflicts, that this is not uncommon (cf. Zartman & Touval, 1985), and it has

been argued that these kinds of interests also play a role in organizational disputes (Carnevale, 1986b).

5. The message and offer proportions were subjected to arc-sine transformations prior to analysis (Winer, 1971).

6. Frequency data allows third parties who communicated on more rounds to exert a greater impact on the character of the data. Proportional data gives equal weight to each third party's messages. The differences between them were negligible. Thus, results that follow focus on mean proportions of messages sent by the third parties.

7. Past studies (Carnevale & Henry, 1989; Carnevale & Conlon, 1988) showed that compensation was not uncommon. The scenario used in this research provided little impetus for a third party to consider compensation. Also, the overall frequency of compensation may not indicate its importance, as only one instance of compensation may have the intended effect and resolve the conflict (cf. Touval & Zartman, 1985).

Table 1

The Issue/Payoff Tables for the New York and Boston Managers

NEW YORK MANAGER'S PAYOFF TABLE

Cut-Off Money		Number of Years		Promotion	
120	A	80	A	40	A
105	B	70	B	35	B
90	C	60	C	30	C
75	D	50	D	25	D
60	E	40	E	20	E
45	F	30	F	15	F
30	G	20	G	10	G
15	H	10	H	5	H
0	I	0	I	0	I

BOSTON MANAGER'S PAYOFF TABLE

Cut-Off Money		Number of Years		Promotion	
0	A	0	A	0	A
5	B	10	B	15	B
10	C	20	C	30	C
15	D	30	D	45	D
20	E	40	E	60	E
25	F	50	F	75	F
30	G	60	G	90	G
35	H	70	H	105	H
40	I	80	I	120	I

Table 2

Third Party Issue/Payoff Tables as a Function of Self-Interest and Concern

(A) Low Self-Interest, No Concern

Cut-Off Money	Number of years	Promotion
0 A	0 A	0 A
0 B	0 B	0 B
0 C	0 C	0 C
0 D	0 D	0 D
0 E	0 E	0 E
0 F	0 F	0 F
0 G	0 G	0 G
0 H	0 H	0 H
0 I	0 I	0 I

(B) High Self-Interest, No Concern

Cut-Off Money	Number of Years	Promotion
0 A	40 A	120 A
15 B	40 B	105 B
30 C	40 C	90 C
45 D	40 D	75 D
60 E	40 E	60 E
75 F	40 F	45 F
90 G	40 G	30 G
105 H	40 H	15 H
120 I	40 I	0 I

(C) Low Interest, High Concern

Cut-Off Money	Number of years	Promotion
120 A	40 A	0 A
105 B	40 B	15 B
90 C	40 C	30 C
75 D	40 D	45 D
60 E	40 E	60 E
45 F	40 F	75 F
30 G	40 G	90 G
15 H	40 H	105 H
0 I	40 I	120 I

(D) High Self-Interest, High Concern

Cut-Off Money	Number of Years	Promotion
120 A	40 A	120 A
105 B	40 B	105 B
90 C	40 C	90 C
75 D	40 D	75 D
60 E	40 E	60 E
75 F	40 F	75 F
90 G	40 G	90 G
105 H	40 H	105 H
120 I	40 I	120 I

Note: Although subjects in the low self-interest, low concern condition saw a table of zeros, they were told that they would receive a fixed amount of lottery tickets for prizes if any agreement was reached.

Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Among Questionnaire Measures in MANOVA

Measure	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. Important to reach agreement	4.74	1.36																		
2. Want managers to get good outcome	4.49	1.29	.49																	
3. Third party wants good outcome	5.05	1.30	.37	.52																
4. Power of NY Manager	2.59	0.81	.06	.28	.19															
5. Power of Boston Manager	2.41	0.78	.02	.28	.14	.73														
6. Willingness to be in future negotiations between managers	2.34	0.94	.17	.18	.14	.16	.10													
7. Prefer NY over Boston	3.00	0.57	.01	.06	.08	.01	.02	.06												
8. My proposals were influential	2.00	0.86	.05	.11	.02	.06	.03	.30	.15											
9. My messages were influential	1.84	0.84	.08	.05	-.00	.06	.02	.24	.13	.58										
10. Satisfied with progress of disputants toward agreement	2.42	1.40	-.06	.12	-.02	.14	.12	.24	.07	.44	.28									
11. Important to give managers equal outcomes	4.70	1.35	.34	.32	.27	.03	.06	.11	.04	.22	.20	.11								
12. Dissatisfied with discretion available	3.60	1.56	-.07	-.02	-.03	.03	.05	-.19	-.02	-.20	-.13	-.20	-.08							
13. NY Manager needs assistance	2.67	1.12	.20	.17	.14	.03	-.04	.24	-.03	.32	.28	-.04	.19	-.04						
14. Boston Manager needs assistance	2.72	1.13	.17	.16	.15	.09	-.10	.22	.09	.31	.29	-.02	.20	-.05	.88					
15. Want Boston to do better than NY	2.71	0.67	.08	.08	.07	-.05	.09	.10	.10	.07	.09	.04	.15	.02	.11	.09				
16. Self-confidence	2.99	1.11	.22	.21	.26	.01	-.01	.26	.10	.20	.14	.03	.31	-.20	.29	.31	.15			
17. Control over negotiations	1.95	1.72	.05	.06	.09	.07	.12	.24	-.00	.23	.18	.06	.05	-.23	.20	.18	.11	.22		
18. Dissatisfied with actions of disputants	3.44	1.44	-.00	-.06	-.02	-.04	-.06	-.27	.02	-.29	-.17	-.42	-.05	.45	-.09	-.09	.01	-.23	-.23	
19. Trying to make offers bargainers will like	4.32	1.33	.32	.44	.31	.31	.29	.24	.09	.20	.15	.10	.43	.00	.30	.31	.17	.28	.12	-.03

Note. Decimal points omitted. Correlations greater than or equal to .13 are significant at $p < .05$. Items 9-10 are 4 point scales. Items 4-7 and 13-17 are 5 point scales. All others are 6 point scales.

Table 4

Examples of Messages Selected or Created by the Third PartiesPressing

You are too stubborn -- you had better make more concessions.

Dropping down one letter won't do it!

Problem Solving

Let's find a creative solution that makes everyone happy.

Instead of taking a competitive stance, we should try to seek a coordinated solution.

Compensating

If you agree, I will transfer some new accounts to your region.

Agree and if I win I'll give you some of my money.

Inaction

I think that you should work this out yourselves.'

No message.

Imposing

If you don't settle this soon, I will settle it for you.

Give on promotion or I will force your hand and screw you.

Pressing and Problem Solving

At AEI you both receive a good outcome! Stop being so stubborn and accept this!

Note. With the exception of the last category, the first message in each category is an example of a message provided to the third parties. The second message in each condition is an example of a message generated by the third parties. All "pressing and problem solving" messages were generated by third parties.

Table 5

Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of MessagesUsed as a Function of Role (Mediator Versus Intravener), PerceivedCommon Ground (PCG), Concern, and Interest.

			Low PCG		High PCG	
Low Self-Interest, Mediator	Low Concern	Pressing	.26	(.27)	.13	(.17)
		Problem Solving	.31	(.21)	.23	(.21)
		Compensating	.14	(.20)	.03	(.07)
		Inaction	.25	(.30)	.51	(.32)
		Imposing	.03	(.05)	.05	(.10)
		Pressing & Problem Solving	.02	(.05)	.05	(.11)
	High Concern	Pressing	.17	(.15)	.12	(.18)
		Problem Solving	.38	(.22)	.44	(.29)
		Compensating	.04	(.08)	.03	(.06)
		Inaction	.37	(.25)	.35	(.38)
		Imposing	.02	(.08)	.02	(.05)
		Pressing & Problem Solving	.02	(.05)	.04	(.07)
High Self-Interest, Mediator	Low Concern	Pressing	.17	(.16)	.19	(.17)
		Problem Solving	.25	(.19)	.35	(.28)
		Compensating	.08	(.16)	.11	(.22)
		Inaction	.34	(.30)	.27	(.28)
		Imposing	.03	(.07)	.05	(.12)
		Pressing & Problem Solving	.13	(.28)	.04	(.09)
	High Concern	Pressing	.15	(.16)	.15	(.11)
		Problem Solving	.36	(.29)	.38	(.24)
		Compensating	.07	(.12)	.09	(.18)
		Inaction	.28	(.35)	.36	(.28)
		Imposing	.02	(.05)	.00	(.00)
		Pressing & Problem Solving	.11	(.21)	.02	(.09)

Table 5 (continued)

			Low PCG		High PCG	
Low Self-Interest, Intravener	Low Concern	Pressing	.17	(.18)	.23	(.23)
		Problem Solving	.30	(.30)	.40	(.31)
		Compensating	.00	(.00)	.00	(.00)
		Inaction	.39	(.33)	.23	(.28)
		Imposing	.12	(.15)	.12	(.12)
		Pressing & Problem Solving	.02	(.05)	.02	(.05)

	High Concern	Pressing	.26	(.15)	.25	(.30)
		Problem Solving	.21	(.15)	.42	(.27)
		Compensating	.12	(.15)	.10	(.10)
		Inaction	.15	(.14)	.15	(.14)
		Imposing	.22	(.14)	.06	(.09)
		Pressing & Problem Solving	.05	(.10)	.02	(.05)

High Self-Interest, Intravener	Low Concern	Pressing	.38	(.34)	.10	(.12)
		Problem Solving	.16	(.19)	.20	(.23)
		Compensating	.07	(.16)	.01	(.04)
		Inaction	.26	(.37)	.57	(.37)
		Imposing	.13	(.20)	.06	(.10)
		Pressing & Problem Solving	.00	(.00)	.06	(.15)

	High Concern	Pressing	.31	(.17)	.08	(.11)
		Problem Solving	.32	(.18)	.38	(.34)
		Compensating	.04	(.08)	.07	(.13)
		Inaction	.16	(.17)	.34	(.36)
		Imposing	.13	(.13)	.10	(.10)
		Pressing & Problem Solving	.05	(.08)	.03	(.07)

Note. Means in Table refer to mean proportions of messages used.

Table 6

Means for Significant Differences on Dependent Measures Due to Third Party Role andPerceived Common Ground (PCG)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Mediator</u>	<u>Intravenor</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Low PCG</u>	<u>High PCG</u>	<u>F</u>
Length of negotiation (in rounds)	6.79	5.69	13.42 ^{***}	6.23	6.26	0.01
Number of same offers	2.78	3.47	7.93 ^{**}	3.07	3.17	0.16
Compromise suggestions	.18	.12	3.78 [*]	.16	.18	0.67
Self-interested suggestions	.08	.09	0.26	.05	.10	4.53 [*]
Pressing messages	.17	.22	4.58 [*]	.23	.15	7.45 ^{**}
Problem solving messages	.34	.29	0.45	.29	.35	4.34 [*]
Imposing messages	.03	.12	38.40 ^{***}	.09	.06	3.91 [*]
Important to reach agreement	4.49	5.00	8.07 ^{**}	4.89	4.59	2.96
New York Manager needs assistance	2.28	3.07	32.76 ^{***}	2.86	2.49	7.17 ^{**}
Boston Manager needs assistance	2.35	3.09	27.83 ^{***}	2.91	2.52	7.68 ^{**}
Dissatisfied with actions of disputants	3.71	3.16	8.40 ^{**}	3.70	3.18	7.78 ^{**}
Satisfied with progress of disputants toward agreement	2.54	2.30	1.77	1.94	2.90	29.83 ^{***}

Table 6 (continued)

Variable	Mediator	Intravention	F	Low PCG	High PCG	F
Self-confidence	2.74	3.25	11.85 ^{***}	2.97	3.01	0.07
My proposals were influential	1.86	2.14	6.29 ^{**}	1.87	2.12	4.90 [*]
My messages were influential	1.70	2.00	8.02 ^{**}	1.86	1.82	0.13
Dissatisfied with discretion available	3.98	3.22	14.78 ^{***}	3.91	3.30	9.86 ^{***}
Willingness to be in future negotiations between managers	2.18	2.51	6.92 ^{**}	2.32	2.36	0.09
Control over negotiation	1.29	2.61	36.01 ^{***}	1.86	2.04	0.64

Note. Means in Table for settlement suggestions and messages are mean proportions. All F values are based on (1, 206) degrees of freedom. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.





Figure 1. An Integrated Model of Organizational Dispute Reduction by Third Parties

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